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NO. 49 SEPTEMBER 2021 Introduction 
Political Prisoners in Sisi’s Egypt 
Arbitrary Detention as an Obstacle to German Stabilisation Efforts 
Patricia Jannack and Stephan Roll 
Thousands have been imprisoned for their political and ideological views in Egypt 
since the 2013 military takeover and Abdel-Fatah al-Sisi’s subsequent rise to the 
presidency. This policy has dramatic humanitarian consequences, but also increasingly 
promotes radicalisation, strengthens rejection of state institutions, and hinders devel-
opment of the country’s civil society and economy. It also undermines Germany’s 
efforts to use financial aid and development cooperation to stabilise Egypt, the 
Mediterranean’s most populous country. The German government should therefore 
increase its pressure on Egypt’s leaders and call for far-reaching amnesty. In doing 
so, it is important to emphasise the personal responsibility of the president and to tie 
future loans and debt rescheduling to concrete steps that end arbitrary detentions. 
 
In recent months, isolated releases of politi-
cal prisoners have been witnessed in Egypt. 
Most recently, six prominent activists and 
journalists were released in July 2021 and 
three others at the end of August. Still, con-
sidering new arrests and the continuation 
of politically motivated trials, it seems pre-
mature to expect an end to the policy of 
arbitrary imprisonment of dissidents. More-
over, individual releases are only a drop in 
the bucket when compared to the number 
of political prisoners. Human rights orga-
nisations report that up to 65,000 people 
have been detained for political reasons 
since 2013. Most are charged with support-
ing terrorist activities and spreading false 
news – arbitrary accusations that are used 
to justify pre-trial detentions, in some cases 
for several years. Prisoners are held in the 
country’s detention centres under inhu-
mane conditions, which have worsened 
in recent months due to the Coronavirus 
pandemic. Nonetheless, the policy of 
arbitrary detention is not only a problem 
from the humanitarian point of view. 
Radicalisation and Rejection of 
State Institutions 
Reports show that Egypt’s completely over-
crowded prisons serve as a recruiting ground 
for militant groups on the Islamist-jihadist 
spectrum. Prisoners often have to share 
their cells with supporters of the so-called 
Islamic State (IS) and members of other 
militant Islamist groups. It is easy for such 
groups to promote their radical ideology 
in this environment, and the government 
apparently sees them as less of a threat 
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than the moderate Islamist Muslim Brother-
hood, against which it battles uncompro-
misingly. Many of the leading cadres of the 
Brotherhood were sentenced to death in 
mass trials that did not adhere to rule-of-
law standards; they are now awaiting 
execution. 
Outside of the prisons, anger and despair 
within the prisoners’ social circles contrib-
ute, if not to radicalisation, then at least to 
the rejection of state and political institu-
tions among parts of the population. This 
reinforces a trend that has been apparent in 
Egypt for some time. Even though opinion 
polls must be treated with caution in authori-
tarian contexts, surveys as recent as 2018 
show that trust in state institutions is wan-
ing for many Egyptians. 
These developments do not bode well for 
the country’s security situation or stability. 
It is true that through the use of mass 
repression the government has succeeded 
in preventing major attacks on population 
centres since 2019. However, the situation 
in parts of the Sinai Peninsula shows that a 
high potential for violence remains. In the 
north of Sinai, civil war-like conditions 
have prevailed for years, failing to be brought 
under control despite considerable efforts 
by the security apparatus. Since the begin-
ning of 2021 alone, there have been over 
80 attacks and more than 40 clashes, which 
together have claimed at least 175 lives. The 
influx of insurgents appears unchecked. 
Arbitrary mass arrests could also contribute 
to the Egyptian military’s inability to count 
on local support for its anti-terrorist opera-
tions, with parts of the local population 
even joining armed militias. 
Weakening Civil Society and the 
Economy 
Politically motivated imprisonment is also 
a central obstacle to the development of a 
vibrant civil society. Young, well-educated 
Egyptians who are socially active must fear 
state repression, including imprisonment, 
to a particularly high degree. Many of them 
therefore seek to leave the country. Indeed, 
when members of the middle and upper 
classes go abroad to study or work, it is 
not uncommon for them to do so because 
they fear becoming victims of the excessive 
arrest campaign. Such worries are justified 
because people who study or research in 
Europe and then travel to their Egyptian 
homeland for vacation have repeatedly 
been arrested. 
The country’s economic development, in 
turn, suffers from the fact that members of 
the state bureaucracy and the private sector 
are imprisoned for political reasons. For 
example, the head of the Egyptian Court of 
Accounts was imprisoned for pointing out 
irregularities in the state budget in 2015. 
Against this backdrop, it is no longer fea-
sible to conceive of a politically independ-
ent fight against corruption. The country’s 
largest milk producer was also imprisoned, 
much to the dismay of other businessmen. 
There are serious indications that the entre-
preneur is now being forced to hand over 
his flourishing business to the public sec-
tor. Market observers see this as a signifi-
cant obstacle to private investment. 
Responsibility of the President 
It is up to President Sisi alone to end the 
policy of arbitrary detention. Contrary to 
what Cairo officially likes to claim, the 
country does not have an independent 
judiciary at all. This is due in particular to 
the state of emergency that was extended 
for the 16th time in a row in July 2021. 
It effectively abolishes the separation of 
powers and grants the president far-reach-
ing powers. In addition, Sisi has been able 
to directly influence how high offices in the 
judiciary are filled, not least since the con-
stitutional amendments of 2019. Moreover, 
more recent amendments to the law, which 
were made under the pretext of fighting 
the pandemic, have further increased the 
powers of the military judiciary, even over 
civilians. The president therefore exerts just 
as much influence on the progression of 
politically motivated trials as on the arbi-
trary prolongation of pre-trial detentions, 
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which are systematically practiced. Above 
all, however, he can bring about an extra-
judicial solution to existing cases by making 
use of “presidential pardons,” an instru-
ment provided by Article 155 of the con-
stitution. To enact a general amnesty, he 
would need to involve parliament, which is 
controlled by his supporters. Sisi would also 
barely need to take the security apparatus 
in account; thanks to clever personnel deci-
sions within the military leadership and in-
telligence services, he is now the undisputed 
leader of the regime. 
Sisi’s willingness to change this policy is 
likely to be limited, however, because his 
rule lacks legitimacy. His popular support 
is dubious. His “re-election” in 2018 was 
marked by empty polling stations and mas-
sive repression of potential rivals. In 2019, 
socioeconomic imbalance in the country 
even caused massive anti-regime protests 
that could only be contained through the 
use of widespread police violence and 
thousands of arrests. Most recently, the 
questionable management of the Corona-
virus pandemic, the consequences of which 
many Egyptians are currently suffering, is 
unlikely to have increased the president’s 
approval ratings. 
Time for Germany to 
Increase Pressure 
Bilaterally and together with its European 
partners, the German government has been 
trying for years to stabilise Egypt, the most 
populous country in its southern neigh-
bourhood with a population of over 100 
million. With loans totalling over $2.8 bil-
lion, Germany is one of Egypt’s largest 
creditors. From the military coup of 2013 to 
the end of 2019, Cairo has received around 
one billion euros in financial support from 
Berlin. Since then, however, arbitrary 
detentions have also continued apace. This 
policy clearly runs counter to the long-term 
stabilisation of the country due to the con-
sequences described above. The German 
government should therefore exert signifi-
cantly more pressure on the Egyptian 
leadership to achieve a change of course 
in Cairo – not only for reasons related to 
human rights and humanitarian principles, 
but also with a view to goals in the realm 
of development policy in terms of crisis and 
conflict prevention. 
The present moment favours this course 
of action for three reasons. First, President 
Sisi is currently aiming to improve Egypt’s 
image, and thus also that of his rule, as part 
of an aggressive nation-branding campaign. 
Under the slogan “New Republic,” he is 
trying to portray the country and its leader-
ship as modern, economically ambitious 
and open to the world. Large-scale devel-
opment projects, such as the construction 
of a new capital city and a “progressive” 
interpretation of Islam from above, serve 
this purpose. The announcement of a 
“national human rights strategy” and the 
selective release of prisoners are intended 
to counter international criticism. Germany 
should make it clear that such symbolic 
cosmetics will not be effective. As long as 
there are no serious efforts to change policy 
in Cairo, criticism should be intensified 
to the degree that Berlin levelled in March 
2021 together with European and inter-
national partners, including the United 
States, before the UN Human Rights Coun-
cil. In the process, President Sisi’s responsi-
bility as the ultimate decision-maker should 
be strongly emphasised and gestures of his 
political upgrading, for example through 
high-level state visits, should be forgone. 
Second, Egypt’s government will likely 
need to start new negotiations on financial 
aid with the country’s creditors in coming 
months. The needs of the heavily indebted 
country are considerable. Its budget deficit 
in fiscal year 2020/21 amounted to 7.8 per-
cent of gross domestic product, or more 
than $30 billion. Over the past six years, the 
deficit could only be covered by extensive 
programs run by the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) with the participation of 
other lenders. The last program expires in 
June 2021. However, Sisi’s ambitious devel-
opment plans cannot be realised without 
new external aid. Germany will not only be 
directly involved in such negotiations – as 
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one of the most important creditors – but 
also indirectly through its voting rights 
at international financial institutions and 
European development banks. The German 
government should use this position to 
demand the Egyptian side to engage in con-
structive negotiations with human rights 
organisations and prisoners’ representatives 
on the release of prisoners. Many prisoners, 
not least those from the spectrum of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, would be willing to 
make far-reaching concessions for their 
release, even to the extent of recognising 
President Sisi’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, the 
government has so far categorically rejected 
any talks. Further financial aid and the re-
scheduling of loans should be made contin-
gent upon the commencement and progress 
of such negotiations. To evaluate Egyptian 
policy, the German government can rely 
on the monitoring of human rights organi-
sations such as the Arabic Network for 
Human Rights Information, which has been 
documenting arbitrary detentions in detail 
for years with the help of databases. 
And third, US policy toward Egypt is cur-
rently in flux. Under President Joe Biden, 
criticism of the human rights situation in 
the country, and especially of the policy of 
arbitrary detention, has increased notice-
ably in Washington. It is to be feared that 
Biden, like his predecessor, will not lay a 
finger on the United States’ extensive mili-
tary aid to Cairo. If this is the case, Biden 
may need to adjust his Egypt policy in other 
areas, otherwise he may face a considerable 
loss of credibility among the ranks of his 
own Democratic Party. The US adminis-
tration could therefore be an important 
partner to the German government both in 
exercising criticism within international 
forums and in exerting pressure in future 
multinational financial aid negotiations. 
Patricia Jannack was an intern in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP. 
Dr Stephan Roll is Head of the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP. 
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